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VACCINES AND AIRLINE TRAVEL:  
A FEDERAL ROLE TO PROTECT THE 
PUBLIC HEALTH 
Christopher T. Robertson† 
This Article explores two ways in which airline travel is an important vector for 
the spread of infectious disease, and argues that airlines have market-based and 
liability-based reasons to require that passengers be vaccinated. Going further, the 
Article explores whether the federal government has the legal and constitutional 
authority—especially under the Commerce Clause—to encourage or mandate that 
airlines implement such a vaccine screen. By disrupting the spread of disease at key 
network nodes where individuals interact and then connect with other geographic 
regions, and by creating another incentive for adult vaccination, an airline vaccine 
screen could be an effective and legally viable tool for the protection of public health.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 For a wide range of highly contagious and dangerous diseases, the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) has approved safe and effective vaccines, which the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) now routinely recommends.1 With the 
eradication of smallpox worldwide in 1977, the eradication of polio in the United 
States in 1979, and the 100,000-fold reduction in the prevalence of diseases like 
diphtheria, measles, mumps, and pertussis, the success of vaccines cannot be 
disputed.2  
However, the rates of vaccination have been insufficient to eradicate some 
diseases.3 “Approximately 42,000 adults and 300 children in the United States die each 
year from vaccine-preventable diseases.”4 On the horizon are new vaccinations, which 
may address avian flu, H5N1 influenza, H1N1 influenza, norovirus, Ebola, and 
tuberculosis.5 Moreover, it will soon be possible to invent a new vaccine to fight a 
disease outbreak as it is happening.6  
For all these diseases, the solution to morbidity and mortality is not merely 
technological—it depends on human behavior. Without high levels of vaccination, 
these infectious diseases will remain a significant threat.  
In the American tradition of federalism, state and local governments have 
exercised the plenary “police power,” which includes the primary responsibility to 
secure the public health and, in particular, to fight infectious diseases.7 Accordingly, 
much of the legislative action and litigation around vaccines has focused on state 
mandates to vaccinate children as a prerequisite for their attendance at schools.8 These 
state mandates vary widely in the ease by which parents may exempt their children 
                                                 
1 The recommended vaccines include hepatitis A & B, rotavirus, tetanus, acelluar pertussis, 
haemophillus influenzae, pneumococcal conjugate, polysaccharide, and 13-valent conjugate, poliovirus, 
influenza, measles, mumps, rubella, varicella, human papilloma virus, meningococcal disease, and zoster. 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION [CDC], Immunization Schedules, 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/easy-to-read/index.html [http://perma.cc/2M3J-ALYN] (last updated 
Jan. 26, 2016); see also Vaccine Information Statements (VIS), CDC, 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/vis/index.html [http://perma.cc/E2FN-4ZWE] (last updated Aug. 7, 2015) 
(listing multi and routine vaccinations). 
2 See generally Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health 
Imperative and Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, 262-84 (Richard A. Goodman et al. 
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2003). 
3 Id. at 266 (showing vaccination coverage for a range of diseases, ranging from 94% to as low as 
73%). 
4 See Off. Of Disease Prevention & Promotion, Immunization and Infectious Disease, 
HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/immunization-and-
infectious-diseases?topicid=23 [http://perma.cc/7PEA-WGDL] (last updated Mar. 25, 2016). 
5 See PhRMA, VACCINES, A REPORT ON THE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF DISEASE THROUGH 
VACCINES, MEDICINES IN DEVELOPMENT (2013), http://phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Vaccines_2013.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/UX9Z-Q86Q].  
6 Similarly, during the Ebola outbreak of 2014-15, Ebola vaccines were being developed and tested on 
a fast track. See Ebola: The Race for Drugs and Vaccines, BBC (Mar. 27, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/health-28663217 [http://perma.cc/Y42Y-VWBJ].  
7 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 11 (1905) (“The police power of a State embraces such 
reasonable regulations . . . established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and 
safety.”). 
8 See generally Malone & Hinman, supra, note 2, at 269-73. 





and, consequently, the rates of vaccination and the risk of contagion differ across the 
United States. Even more, these mandates have no direct effect on the vaccination 
rates of adults and do little to address the movement of unvaccinated individuals across 
state or international borders. 
Adult vaccination has become increasingly important.9 In the near future, when a 
new vaccine is quickly developed to respond to a specific outbreak of a more exotic 
disease, adult vaccination may be essential. It may not be sufficient to rely on school 
vaccinations and the smattering of adult vaccination programs, such as those for 
healthcare workers. Nor will an optimal adult vaccination strategy be random. It will 
instead follow the same human network of interactions that spread disease, targeting 
nodes in which a vaccination may have the greatest disruption of the transmission of 
disease.10 
Airports and airlines are arguably one of the most important nodes. On average, 
Americans take 2.1 airline trips each year.11 The United States airlines move 
approximately two million people every day.12 If unvaccinated, these travelers are 
more likely to carry infectious diseases with them. This problem can be viewed as one 
of externalities, flowing across jurisdictional borders: a state’s sovereign prerogative to 
have robust vaccination laws that protect its residents is undermined if unvaccinated 
individuals from other states cross its borders daily.13 Because vaccines can only 
provide imperfect protection to those who receive them, and some individuals are 
unable to be vaccinated at all (due to other medical problems), those who choose to be 
unvaccinated pose a public health threat.14  
Leading voices in public health law have warned about cramped legal conceptions 
of federalism, which may undermine the government’s ability to protect its citizens.15 
Of particular concern is NFIB v. Sebelius, a recent United States Supreme Court 
                                                 
9 See Adult Vaccination: An Important Step in Protecting Your Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/features/vaccineschronicconditions/ [http://perma.cc/4HBD-ZCHC] 
(last updated Sept. 23, 2015) (recommending adult vaccinations for seasonal flu every year, Td vaccine 
every ten years to protect against tetanus or Tdap vaccine once to protect against tetanus and diphtheria plus 
pertussis (whooping cough), and additional vaccines depending on age and lifestyle, including those for 
shingles, human papillomavirus, pneumococcal disease, meningococcal disease, hepatitis A and B, 
chickenpox (varicella), and measles, mumps, and rubella). 
10 See generally Lazaros K. Gallos et al., Improving Immunization Strategies, E 75 PHYSICAL REVIEW 
045104-1 (2007). For an example of network analysis being applied to vaccination policy, see Marcel 
Salathé et al., A high-resolution human contact network for infectious disease transmission, 107 PNAS 
22020 (2010), http://www.pnas.org/content/107/51/22020.full.  
11 Airlines, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1579/airlines.aspx [http://perma.cc/Q5KQ-LFWZ] 
(last visited Feb. 29, 2016); see also 4 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OMNISTATS: 2005 OMNIBUS SURVEY 
RESULTS 2 (2005), http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/omnistats/ 
volume_04_issue_01/pdf/entire.pdf [http://perma.cc/7VJC-QAQJ] (finding that 42% of Americans surveyed 
flew in the prior twelve months).  
12 AIRLINES FOR AMERICA, http://airlines.org/industry/#safety [http://perma.cc/LR29-SAC3]. 
13 The influx of unvaccinated individuals would erode herd immunity, which requires “sufficient 
immunization coverage” to protect the population as a whole. See PHRMA, supra note 5, at 4. 
14 Malone & Hinman, supra, note 2, at 262-63 (discussing vaccination as a “tragedy of the commons” 
problem); id. at 264 (“When a sufficiently large proportion of individuals in a community is immunized, 
those persons serve as a protective barrier against the likelihood of transmission of the disease in the 
community, thus indirectly protecting those who are not immunized and those who received vaccine but are 
not protected (vaccine failures).”). 
15 See e.g., Mark A. Hall, Constitutional Mortality: Precedential Effects of Striking the Individual 
Mandate, 75 L. & CONT. PROBS. 107 (limiting by constitutional doctrine is a “frightening prospect” because 
“this very power might someday be absolutely essential to saving a million or more lives, based on solid 
public health science, in the event of a catastrophic public health emergency”); Wendy E. Parmet, After 
September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 201, 201 (2002) (“Dogmatic 
and rigid visions of federalism can imperil the public health whether the threat is natural or manmade.”). 




decision. The Court held that the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution 
does not support a congressional mandate requiring individuals to purchase health 
insurance.16 Some have argued that this decision, and the larger conception of 
federalism it represents, erodes the constitutionality of core public health functions of 
the federal government.17 A vaccination mandate, tracking the channels and 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, may reinvigorate Commerce Clause doctrine 
for public health.  
This Article is the first scholarly assessment of three issues: (1) whether airline 
travel is itself an important vector for the spread of infectious disease; (2) if so, 
whether airlines have market-based and liability-based reasons to require that 
passengers be vaccinated; and, (3) whether the federal government has the legal and 
constitutional authority to either encourage or mandate that airlines do so. The 
scientific literature suggests that by disrupting the spread of disease at key network 
nodes where individuals interact with each other and then connect with other 
geographic regions, a vaccine screen could be an effective tool for the protection of 
public health.18 The legal analysis suggests that a vaccine screen could be a legally 
viable tool for the protection of public health, falling squarely within the authority of 
the federal government.  
Of course, vaccinations are not our only tool to address the problem of air travel 
and infectious disease.19 In particular, the CDC maintains a “Do Not Board” list, which 
prohibits certain individuals from flying domestically or internationally if they have a 
communicable disease that presents a public health risk.20 A primary limitation of such 
policies is that they are only effective for patients that have become symptomatic and 
have received a diagnosis that was passed on to the CDC for a decision about whether 
to list the person. For contagious but asymptomatic people, or symptomatic people 
who have not yet received a diagnosis, the Do Not Board list is ineffective. Another 
possibility is to use body scanning technologies or simple contact thermometers to 
attempt to identify infected persons who may have higher body temperatures, but this 
strategy also has practical limitations, raising many false positives and false 
negatives.21  
                                                 
16 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); see also Wendy Parmet, The 
Individual Mandate: Implications for Public Health Law, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 401, 406 (2011) (arguing 
that “infectious disease controls, including vaccine mandates, may offer the strongest case for public health 
mandates”). 
17 See, e.g., Arjun K. Jaikumar, Note, Red Flags in Federal Quarantine: The Questionable 
Constitutionality of Federal Quarantine After NFIB v. Sebelius, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 677, 680 (2014) 
(arguing that NFIB “may render the federal quarantine power unconstitutional”). 
18 See discussion infra Part II.B-C. 
19 Yvonne L. Huizer et al., Usefulness and Applicability of Infectious Disease Control Measures in Air 
Travel: A Review, 13 TRAVEL MED. & INFECTIOUS DISEASE 19, 19 (2015) (reviewing various other tools, 
including hygiene measures, exit and entry screening, and providing information to travelers). 
20 See CDC, Federal Register Notice: Criteria for Requesting Federal Travel Restrictions for Public 
Health Purposes, Including for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, 80 Fed. Reg. 16400 (Mar. 27, 2015); see also 
CDC, Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes — United States, June 200 — May 2008, 
57 MMWR WEEKLY 1009 (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5737a1.htm 
[http://perma.cc/GKV9-7Z5R] (describing a one-year period in which the “CDC received requests to place 
42 persons on the DNB [Do Not Board] list,” leading to 33 being actually added, all of whom were thought 
to have infectious pulmonary TB).  
21 See Patricia C. Priest et al., Thermal Image Scanning for Influenza Border Screening: Results of an 
Airport Screening Study, 6 PLOS ONE e14490, e14490 (2011) (“Our findings therefore suggest that ITIS 
[infrared thermal image scanners] is unlikely to be effective for entry screening of travellers [sic] to detect 
influenza infection with the intention of preventing entry of the virus into a country.”); Jessica Glenza, 
Ebola: Are Thermal Scanners Effective Prevention Tools or Just a Placebo?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2014), 





For the purposes of this initial foray into the question, let us remain agnostic about 
the particular vaccines that would be included in such a screening policy (whether for 
measles, influenza, or Ebola), the logistics of implementing such a screen (including 
the documentation required, ranging from documented immune response to a vaccine 
registry to a simple affirmation under penalty of perjury), and the scope and 
procedures for any potential exemptions (medical, religious, or philosophical). These 
variations will be important practically, politically, and legally, but a more general 
analysis is useful to frame the question.  
II.  AIRLINE TRAVEL AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
Consider three mechanisms by which air travel may affect the spread of infectious 
disease. First, passenger-to-passenger transmission by contact (i.e., touching, 
coughing, sneezing, etc.) is increased during air travel. Second, regardless of what 
happens between passengers on the airplane, the air travel of infected passengers is an 
extremely efficient mechanism for rapidly distributing a disease across state borders 
and worldwide. This Article proposes a third, novel mechanism for air travel to reduce 
the spread of infectious disease. If airline travel were the predicate for a vaccination 
mandate, it could serve as an important incentive for people to get vaccinated, thereby 
creating spillover benefits beyond the domain of air travel.  
A. PASSENGER-TO-PASSENGER TRANSMISSION 
The popular media portrays airline travel as if it were a journey into an 
apocalypse, with disease at every turn. One headline reads: Horrific Hygiene On 
Flights Revealed: Poo On Tray Tables, Urine On Seats And 80 Million Bacteria 
Living On Your Suitcase.22 CNN reports that some tray tables are infected with MRSA 
(Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus Aureus) at five times the rate of New York 
subway poles, and warned about the airplane “lavatory as a major danger area for the 
spread of disease during the H1N1 flu and SARS epidemics.”23 Mass media often cites 
survey data, which suggests that flying on an airline dramatically increases—by over 
100 times—the chances that an individual will be infected with any of the roughly 200 
viruses known to produce the common cold.24  
The scientific literature is more sober and relatively undeveloped, but it leaves 
grounds for concern.25 Means of microorganism transmission can be organized into 
four main categories: contact, airborne, common vehicle, and vector borne.26 Contact 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/01/ebola-prevention-thermal-scanner-effective-placebo 
[http://perma.cc/2MKV-DRXN]. 
22 Natasha Hinde, Horrific Hygiene On Flights Revealed: Poo On Tray Tables, Urine On Seats and 80 
Million Bacteria Living On Your Suitcase, HUFFINGTON POST UK (May 18, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/05/18/hygiene-on-flights-revealed-poo-tray-tables-bacteria-
suitcases_n_7304226.html [http://perma.cc/88ZN-ET4C]. 
23 Douglas Wright, 6 Places Germs Breed in a Plane, BUDGET TRAVEL (Dec. 22, 2010, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/12/22/bt.germs.breed.on.plane/ [http://perma.cc/7TZD-TBMF]. 
24 See Hinde, supra note 22 (referencing, but not citing, Martin Hocking & Harold Foster, Common 
Cold Transmission in Commercial Aircraft: Industry and Passenger Implications, 3 J. ENV’T HEALTH RES. 
7 (2004)).  
25 Scholars have only in recent years turned their attention away from indoor chemical exposure and 
towards indoor air quality in terms of the “microbiomes of built environments.” See Richard L. Corsi et al., 
Microbiomes of Built Environments: 2011 Symposium Highlights and Workgroup Recommendations, 22 
INDOOR AIR 171, 172 (2012).  
26 Alexandra Mangili & Mark A. Gendreau, Transmission of Infectious Diseases During Commercial 
Air Travel, 365 LANCET 989, 990 (2005).  




transmission includes both direct and indirect body-to-body contact, as well as 
transmission by large droplets spread by an infected person sneezing, coughing, or 
talking.27 Of concern to air travelers are those diseases that are airborne and spread by 
contact, such as diphtheria, pertussis, pneumococcal disease, various forms of 
influenza, poliovirus, measles, mumps, rubella, varicella, tuberculosis, meningococcal 
disease, SARS, smallpox, and Ebola.28 Diseases with fecal-oral transmission can also 
be of concern to air travelers, but this is more likely to occur as the result of airline-
associated spread through food served on board.29  
Airlines recycle about fifty percent of the cabin air, which would seem to be an 
obvious vector for disease delivery.30 However, airlines usually filter and deliver the 
air vertically, from the ceiling of the cabin, drawing it downward and out, before 
filtering it and mixing it with fresh air.31 Thus, the scientific literature suggests that 
when the ventilation system is working properly, air quality probably does not 
contribute significantly to the passenger-to-passenger transmission of infectious 
diseases.32 Nonetheless, “[t]ransmission becomes widespread within all sections of the 
passenger cabin when the ventilation system is nonoperational, as shown by an 
influenza outbreak when passengers were kept aboard a grounded aircraft with an 
inoperative ventilation system.”33 Scientists have also expressed worry that the low 
levels of humidity aboard an aircraft may dry out the passengers’ mucous membranes, 
which undermines the body’s natural ability to capture and destroy viruses and 
bacteria.34 
Transmission of diseases spread by contact—which includes large respiratory 
droplets from sneezing, coughing, or talking—is more worrisome.35 Tuberculosis is 
the most studied disease for spread aboard an aircraft; documented cases include a 
passenger traveling between three American cities and infecting the skin of four of 
fifteen fellow passengers but not leading to any cases of active disease.36  
The greatest “risk of disease transmission is associated with a flight time of more 
than 8 [hours] and sitting within two rows of the index passenger.”37 There have been 
reports, however, of diseases spreading more extensively. Measles infections, for 
                                                 
27 Id. It is worth noting that not all the literature uses “airborne” in such a limiting manner, often using 
it to include droplet contact. E.g., L. Morawska, Droplet Fate in Indoor Environments, or Can We Prevent 
the Spread of Infection?, 16 INDOOR AIR 335, 335 (describing relation between droplet particle size and 
airborne travel). This terminology was likely used because it allowed for a clearer distinction between air-
based transmission and transmission relatively independent of air quality.  
28 See EUR. CTR. FOR DISEASE & CONTROL, TECHNICAL REPORT: RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES FOR 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES TRANSMITTED ON AIRCRAFT 11 (2009) (selecting diseases prone to airplane 
transmission for study); see generally CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ [http://perma.cc/T4AF-Z7SL] (providing 
information regarding disease transmission, minimization and prevention). 
29 E.g., J. Eberhart-Phillips et al., An Outbreak of Cholera From Food Served on an International 
Aircraft, 116 EPIDEMIOLOGY & INFECTION 9 (1996). 
30 But see Jessica Nutik Zitter et al., Aircraft Cabin Air Recirculation and Symptoms of the Common 
Cold, 288 JAMA 483, 486 (2002) (finding no greater risk between flights using 100% recycled air versus 
50% recycled air). 
31 K. Leder & D. Newman, Respiratory Infections During Air Travel, 35 INTERNAL MED. J. 50, 51 
(2005). 
32 See generally id.; Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 26.  
33 Mangili & Gendreau supra note 26, at 991.  
34 See Martin B. Hocking & Harold D. Foster, Common Cold Transmission in Commercial Aircraft: 
Industry and Passenger Implications, 3 J. ENVTL. HEALTH RES. (discussing this problem), 
http://www.cieh.org/jehr/jehr3.aspx?id=11412 [http://perma.cc/C6DG-393N]. 
35 See Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 26, at 992 (discussing “the real potential for rapid spread made 
possible by the volume and speed of air travel”).  
36 Id. at 991. 
37 Id. at 992.  





instance, have been shown to spread to patients as far as sixteen rows away.38 In 
another measles outbreak, an infected patient appeared to have infected another person 
flying on the same aircraft, as well as five other people who had merely “visited at 
least one common departure gate.”39 On the other hand, over the course of a seven 
hour flight from Japan to Hawaii, a passenger with measles caused zero infections in 
336 exposed passengers, presumably because the vast majority were immunized.40 
 There have also been various examples of transmission of SARS onboard an 
aircraft.41 Physical proximity to the infected person during the flight was clearly 
correlated to risk of transmission.42 In one example, a flight attendant was infected 
after interacting with and touching the tray and food of an infected person.43 In another 
case, one infected person on a flight of 119 people was associated with potential 
transmission to twenty-two fellow passengers.44  
Norovirus was also probably transmitted passenger-to-passenger on an airplane, 
but by a different mechanism: contamination of the restrooms.45 Due to the specific 
epidemiology of norovirus, and because vomiting was contained to the restrooms, it is 
unlikely that airborne droplets were the cause of transmission.46 Interestingly, all 
passengers suspected of norovirus infection reported that the restrooms were clean.47 
This suggests that maintenance for the prevention of disease transmission requires 
more than apparent cleanliness.  
The flu has similarly been documented to spread aboard airline flights. A 1972 
outbreak of influenza A/Texas strain on a plane, where passengers were kept aboard 
for three hours without an operable ventilation system, “resulted in 72% of all 
passengers about the airline contracting influenza within [three days].”48 The illness 
then spread to twenty percent of their family members within two weeks.49 Other cases 
of influenza contamination on airplanes have involved patients seated as far as five 
rows away from the patient who brought the disease on board.50 
Finally, in addition to the accidental spread of disease person-to-person, there are 
real concerns that airline flights could be an efficient way to distribute bioterrorism 
agents among hundreds of people in very close vicinity. Smallpox is particularly 
worrisome in this regard. In one outbreak in Sweden the spread of smallpox was linked 
to an in-transit exposure that led to "24 secondary cases and four deaths."51  
In short, although the person-to-person spread of disease is not peculiar to airline 
travel, this context intensifies this risk factor. There are few other instances in modern 
social life where an individual person is in such closely proximity to strangers for such 
an extended period of time while eating, drinking, and using the restroom. On the other 
                                                 
38 Frank H. Beard et al., Contact Tracing of In-Flight Measles Exposures: Lessons From an Outbreak 
Investigation and Case Series, Australia, 2010, 2 W. PAC. SURVEILLANCE & RESPONSE J. 1, 6 (2011). 
39 Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 26, at 993. 
40 Id.; Pauli N. Amornkul et al., Low Risk of Measles Transmission After Exposure on an International 
Airline Flight, 189 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES S81, S83 (2004).  
41 Leder & Newman, supra note 31, at 53.  
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Sonja J. Olsen et al., Transmission of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome on Aircraft, 349 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2416, 2416 (2003). 
45 Marc-Alain Widdowson et al., Probable Transmission of Norovirus on an Airplane, 293 JAMA 
1859, 1859-60 (2005). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1860. 
48 Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 26, at 992. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 993. 




hand, with vaccination, widespread immunity to a disease will limit its spread, even in 
these close quarters.52  
B.  THE FLIGHT AS A MEANS OF SPREADING DISEASE ACROSS STATE LINES 
“Perhaps the greatest concern for global health . . . is the ability of a person with a 
contagious illness to travel to virtually any part of the world within 24 [hours].”53 After 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the ban on airline travel and the subsequent 
depression of the air travel market provided a natural experiment that demonstrated 
how air travel contributed to the rate at which a disease spreads across the country. 54 
We now know that the volume of travel is directly related to the rate at which 
influenza viruses spread within the United States.55  
There are documented cases of measles being spread around the country in this 
way. For example, in 1982 a young naval officer from San Diego acquired the disease 
from a two-year-old child there, and then traveled to Washington State, where he then 
infected nine others.56 Only one of these individuals met him face-to-face; the others 
were infected because they were on the same flight or in the same parts of the airport.57 
More recently, a single outbreak of measles at Disneyland was then spread across the 
country by travelers, creating 189 cases, spread across twenty-four states and the 
District of Columbia.58  
“The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),” which caused 774 deaths, 
“spread rapidly around the world, largely because persons infected with the SARS-
associated coronavirus (“SARS-CoV”) traveled on aircraft to distant cities.”59 As the 
CDC explains in its retrospective, “SARS, for the United States, was a travel-
associated illness.”60  
On an international scale, the spread of H1N1 has been correlated to the volume 
of international flights to and from a destination.61 The implication of this study is that 
commercial airports can be mapped and the connections can be used as a means of 
limiting the spread of infectious diseases in the future.62 Another study, also looking at 
                                                 
52 See Amornkul et al., supra note 40, at S81. 
53 Andrew T. Pavia, Germs on a Plane: Aircraft, International Travel, and the Global Spread of 
Disease, 195 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 621, 621 (2007).  
54 John S. Brownstein et al., Empirical Evidence for the Effect of Airline Travel on Inter-Regional 
Influenza Spread in the United States, 3 PLOS MED. 1826, 1826 (2006). 
55 Id. (“We found that domestic airline travel volume . . . predicts the rate of influenza spread.”). 
56 CDC, Epidemiologic Notes and Reports Interstate Importation of Measles Following Transmission 




58 Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html 
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anticipate their risks of importing global infectious diseases.”). 





H1N1, reached a similar conclusion: the volume of international traffic of a United 
States airport can be used to predict the United States arrival time of a disease based 
on the disease’s point of origin.63 
Similarly, Ebola was spread from West Africa and brought to and around the 
United States by airline travel, where the first patient then infected two healthcare 
workers.64 One of those healthcare workers then traveled on a domestic airline to Ohio, 
where she was diagnosed.65 No transmission of the disease to fellow passengers was 
documented.66  
Overall, then, even if there was no risk of passenger-to-passenger spreading of 
disease on the airline, there are important concerns that airlines efficiently move 
passengers from one geographic region, where there may be an outbreak, to another. 
Unvaccinated passengers are more likely to be so infected. 
C.  FLYING AS AN INCENTIVE FOR VACCINATION 
The foregoing discussion has shown that airline travel is an important way for a 
contagion to quickly spread through contemporary society. Aside from blunting those 
causal mechanisms for the spread of disease, a vaccination policy focused on airline 
travel could have secondary benefits for public health generally, since such a mandate 
may cause more individuals to become vaccinated overall. On the margin, these higher 
rates of vaccination will benefit public health in all the other areas where individuals 
may spread contagion, including trains, subways, healthcare settings, restaurants, 
sporting events, and workplaces.  
Virtually all Americans will want to fly at some point during their lives, and most 
Americans want to fly every year.67 Indeed, as of 2003, only eighteen percent of 
survey respondents reported that they have never flown, and many of that small 
percentage were younger individuals who simply have not yet had the opportunity to 
fly.68 Interestingly, families who refuse to vaccinate their children are also more likely 
to have higher incomes and higher levels of education,69 and this is the profile of most 
airline travelers.70 
Some individuals will receive medical exemptions to any vaccine mandate, and a 
mandate keyed to airline travel may also recognize some religious or philosophical 
exemptions, even though there is no constitutional requirement to do so. The 
remaining non-exempt individuals will likely number in the millions, depending on 
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which vaccines are targeted and the scope of any exemptions. These individuals will 
face the vaccination mandate as a choice between either (a) not flying, or (b) becoming 
vaccinated. Some portion of those individuals will find the prospect of life without 
airline travel to be less attractive than the prospect of life fully vaccinated. The size of 
this portion is an empirical question.  
We can hypothesize that the number of individuals who become vaccinated due to 
an airline mandate may be substantial, since the benefits of airline travel are so great. 
In qualitative terms, airline travel allows both leisure (seventy-eight percent of all 
trips) and business (twenty-two percent of all trips).71 The leisure category involves 
visits with family, cultural traditions such as Thanksgiving, and celebrations such as 
weddings. Because only thirty-seven percent of Americans still live in their 
hometowns, there is an imperative to travel back to visit family and friends and to 
participate in important life events.72 The leisure category also includes cultural 
attractions, such as museums and vacations to a wide range of destinations. For 
example, twenty-one million Americans enjoy snow skiing or snowboarding every 
year, and fifteen million Americans enjoy snorkeling, scuba, or sailing every year.73 A 
substantial portion of these individuals do not live near locations where those sports 
are possible, and airline travel may be necessary to enjoy those activities.74  
The business category involves a wide range of opportunities, including sales, 
promotions, professional development, and conferences. In 2015, estimates placed 
American business travel at over 492 million trips.75 For some jobs, a refusal to use 
airline travel may be deeply problematic to career advancement or even retention.  
Another way to measure value is by assessing the amount that individuals spend 
on airline travel. In 2011, Americans spent on average $342 per person on airfare.76 
Basic economic theory suggests that the airline travel was worth at least that much to 
these individuals, or else they would have been unwilling to spend it (preferring 
instead to keep the money).77 In this sense, $342 per year represents the minimum 
value of flying, and therefore is a decent floor for our estimate of the incentive effects 
of an airline vaccine mandate. Of course, the airfare was likely only a means to an 
end—one part of a vacation plan that may cost a few thousand dollars. For destinations 
where driving is infeasible, the actual value of the flight may be much greater than its 
airline fare.  
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Of course, individuals facing a vaccine mandate will weigh it against the out-of-
pocket costs involved with purchasing the vaccine and any hassle involved in doing so. 
For individuals who have health insurance subject to the essential health provisions of 
the Affordable Care Act, vaccines are covered without cost-sharing.78 Still, some 
individuals will lack such coverage and find the costs prohibitive, even though they 
could otherwise afford to fly. This raises larger questions of health policy: is it rational 
to have a healthcare system where costs deter some individuals from securing 
vaccinations that provide a collective benefit to the population? At least in times of an 
outbreak, it would be sensible for the government to fund the vaccination out of 
general tax revenues. 
The similar context of vaccine mandates in healthcare workplaces provides 
analogical evidence as to the behavior of people subject to a mandate. In a systematic 
review of twelve prior studies concerning such employer mandates, scholars found that 
six of the studies documented terminations and voluntary resignations of 0.02-0.15% 
of the workforce.79 Other studies found between three to four percent.80 Against these 
losses of workers, the mandates showed significant increases in vaccinations, often in 
the double digits, with all hospitals achieving greater than ninety-four percent rates of 
vaccination among workers covered by the mandate.81 Whether these mandates alone 
are effective in reducing the spread of disease is another question.82 
Similarly, there is anecdotal evidence from physicians who have required that 
their patients choose between vaccination and finding another doctor. The 
phenomenon is surprisingly common—in one study of Connecticut doctors, thirty 
percent fired patients for vaccine refusal.83 One doctor reports that upon instituting the 
discharge policy, approximately fifty to one hundred patients agreed to be vaccinated 
who otherwise would not have.84 Nonetheless the research on this phenomenon is 
surprisingly sparse; it should be a priority for future study. 
Overall then, an unvaccinated, non-exempt person facing an airline vaccination 
mandate will have to heavily weigh the costs of being non-vaccinated, including both 
the increased risk of disease and the inability to travel by air. Future survey research 
could provide more precise estimates as to the scale of the effect that an airline 
vaccination policy may have on overall vaccination rates, and thus the effect on public 
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health more generally. However, it is plausible that a vaccine screen focused on airline 
travel would increase the levels of vaccination and thus have a salutary effect on the 
control of infectious disease. 
III.  THE EXISTING IMPETUS FOR AIRLINES TO ADOPT A VACCINE 
SCREEN 
This Part examines whether reasons already exist for airlines to adopt a 
vaccination mandate policy. It considers market-based and liability-based reasons. 
A.  MARKET-BASED REASONS AND LOGISTICS 
Before examining the need for government intervention, it is worthwhile to 
consider whether the airlines, as rational profit-seeking enterprises, may have market-
based incentives to adopt some sort of vaccination policy. From the outset, it must be 
acknowledged that this is an odd inquiry: how could it possibly be in the airline 
industry’s interest to refuse some paying passengers? 
Airlines are very sensitive to any suggestion that airline travel may be unsafe, and 
infectious disease poses precisely such a threat to safety. During the Ebola outbreak in 
2014, for example, airline stock prices tumbled, destroying billions of dollars of 
company value based on fears that passengers would stay away from airline travel if 
the outbreak were uncontrolled.85 Between September 2 and October 15, the airline 
index lost sixteen percent of its value, more than double the losses of the S&P 500 
during the same period; American Airlines alone lost more than a quarter of its 
company value.86 Similarly, during the SARS outbreak of 2003, North American 
airlines lost over one billion dollars in revenue due to reduced passenger traffic.87 
Scholarly surveys add weight to these concerns: over three-quarters of respondents say 
that they would avoid public transportation during a pandemic.88  
As a strategy of managing a specific disease outbreak for which there is a vaccine 
available, it is plausible to imagine an airline requiring passengers to be vaccinated in 
order to reassure the other passengers that it is safe to fly. It is more difficult to assess 
whether airlines may have an interest in doing so for more routine infectious diseases, 
like measles or varicella, outside the context of a crisis. As noted above, however, 
there may still be an incentive to avoid negative publicity about airline travel being 
unhealthy, which appears in the mass media on a regular basis.89 
So far, we have focused on the potential for infectious disease to reduce air travel 
generally, but it is also possible for particular airlines to distinguish themselves from 
their competitors by adopting a vaccine policy. Such airlines could thereby brand 
themselves as the cleaner, safer airline for passengers that prefer to fly with others who 
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are similarly vaccinated. Of course, airlines also share airline terminals and security 
screening lines, which prevents them from making a strong claim about relative 
infectious disease safety. 
Of concern for airlines will be the logistics of enforcing any vaccine policy, as 
well as who will bear those costs. After the September 11 attacks, Congress created a 
$2.50 per leg of trip security fee, which paid for the enhanced screening; previously, 
the airlines bore most of these costs themselves.90 Similarly, the cost of screening 
could be spread to passengers, and could be performed collectively for all airlines. 
Alternatively, it could be borne by taxpayers as a whole or by the airlines themselves. 
For a vaccine screen, these burdens could be minor or quite significant, depending 
on the modality used for checking vaccination status and the scope of any such screen, 
whether applied to a particular, highly salient vaccination (e.g., Ebola) or to a wide 
range of vaccinations (some of which a passenger may have only received decades 
ago). The move towards electronic medical records could facilitate this sharing of 
information about vaccine status, especially if the federal government specifies a 
particular standard for data sharing, which otherwise also protects patient privacy. If 
airlines cooperated together to create such a standard, or if the federal government 
actually did so, then an economy of scale could be achieved. Alternatively, for a 
particular, highly salient vaccine (e.g., Ebola or seasonal flu), providers could issue a 
card or electronic token that recipients could display at check-in.  
Another modality would be to simply provide the vaccination at the airport itself, 
as some airports already do for the annual seasonal flu shot.91 While such a practice is 
maximally efficient to reach all flyers at the point of service, the vaccine typically will 
not be immediately effective.92 Nonetheless, it would be valuable as a rollout for the 
many flyers that travel repeatedly.  
The least onerous method would be simply to require passengers to attest, under 
penalty of perjury, that they have received whatever vaccines the airline wishes to 
screen, perhaps supported by random audits (similar to tax enforcement). There will, 
of course, be a trade-off between how rigorous any protocol will be to ensure its 
accuracy, and the costs and burdens of having that level of screening. Herd immunity 
does not require 100% attainment, which suggests that a low-hanging fruit strategy 
may be optimal, at least initially. 
A vaccine screen may also have a different impact on domestic travelers, the vast 
majority of whom may already have a particular vaccine, as opposed to the millions of 
international travelers annually, who may have much lower base rates of vaccination.93 
Currently, American immigration law requires vaccinations for those applying for 
permanent residency status, but does not require vaccinations for temporary travel to 
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the United States.94 Foreign travelers may also have difficulty showing compliance 
with such a mandate if their healthcare providers do not speak English. Still, the World 
Health Organization (“WHO”) already plays a role in facilitating the communication 
of such health information across borders.95 The U.S. State Department could also 
integrate such a mandate in its visa issuance and passport review procedures. Given 
that the index patients may well come from abroad, the effectiveness of any airline 
vaccine screen may depend on working out these logistics in particular. 
Aside from those administrative costs and complications, the bottom line for a 
rational airline is whether a vaccine mandate would ultimately increase or decrease the 
number of seats filled. This empirical question in part depends on what proportion of 
currently unvaccinated and non-exempt passengers would stop flying rather than 
become vaccinated, and whether allayed fears of infectious disease would increase the 
number of flights taken by others. On the other hand, it should be reassuring that the 
vast majority of Americans do not object to vaccinations,96 but more specific data 
about the likely behavior of consumers under such an airline screen is currently 
unavailable. If airlines do move towards a vaccine screen, they may do so collectively. 
The airline industry suffers from market concentration, which makes competition 
along this dimension less likely.97  
B.  LIABILITY-BASED REASONS  
If the market fails to produce an optimal level of vaccinations, background 
liability rules may do so. In particular, tort law imposes upon airlines a duty of care to 
passengers as well as to others on the ground who are foreseeably injured by airline 
operations.  
To be sure, although the airlines are heavily regulated by the Federal Aviation 
Administration, state tort law remedies have not been altogether preempted. However, 
the courts are split as to whether federal law substitutes the common law standard of 
care for a different, arguably lower, standard, which may be sufficient to incentivize 
airlines to take precautions. We first review that common law standard, then consider 
the federal standard, and the divided authority as to which one applies.  
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1.  The Duty to Screen 
Research does not reveal any case law directly on the point of airline liability for 
infectious diseases. Under state tort laws generally, as a common carrier, airlines have 
a duty of care to their passengers to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical 
harm. Traditionally, common carriers were held to an exacting standard approaching 
strict liability: “a duty of utmost care and diligence to their passengers.”98 For 
example, as one court explained, “whether it be termed 'the highest standard of care,' 
'highest degree of vigilance, care and precaution for the safety of those it undertakes to 
transport,' or 'the strictest diligence,’” airlines faced significant liability for their 
passengers’ injuries.99 The modern trend is towards a reasonableness standard that 
extends to risks that are peculiar or heightened by the special relationship of trust and 
dependence, which exists between carrier and passenger.100 This special relationship 
would make it difficult for an airline to claim “nonfeasance,” as if it had no duty to 
protect one person from an infection caused by another.  
Airlines also have duties to people on the ground. For example, an airline may be 
held liable for damages if the plane crashes into a car on the ground.101 In one case, the 
Second Circuit held that an airline could be liable for failing to adequately screen 
passengers against terrorists.102 The September 11 case discussed below is perhaps the 
most noteworthy such holding. 
With regard to ill passengers in particular, airlines have themselves recognized 
their prerogative and duty with regard to the spread of disease. Many airlines already 
have a contract of carriage with a refusal to transport clause that specifies the airline’s 
ability to prevent customers from flying if they have a contagious illness that may be 
transmittable to other passengers.103 
Under the Federal Aviation Act (“FAA”), airline carriers also have specific duties 
of care. The FAA enables the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
(an operating mode of the Department of Transportation) to prescribe “regulations and 
minimum standards for [] practice, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds 
necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.”104 When prescribing these 
regulations, the Administrator must “consider . . . the duty of an air carrier to provide 
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service with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest.”105 The actual 
duty of care proscribed by the regulations, however, seems to be lower, merely 
prohibiting an airline from “operat[ing] an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so 
as to endanger the life or property of another.”106 Arguably, an airline could act 
unreasonably even without being careless or reckless. 
More particularly, section 44902(b) of the FAA provides that an air carrier has 
discretion to “refuse to transport a passenger or property the carrier decides is, or 
might be, inimical to safety.”107 On the basis of this statutory authority, for example, 
the FAA has promulgated regulations for the Secure Flight Program, a 
counterterrorism watch list.108 Under a prior version of the statute, a state appellate 
court interpreted section 44902(b) to also allow the airline to refuse passage to a sick 
individual so as to not interfere with the airline’s duty to other passengers.109 But no 
such case has dealt with the issue of an airline’s potential liability to injured 
passengers for failure to refuse passage to a sick or unvaccinated individual.110  
 It is clear that the plaintiff’s right to a private cause of action has not been 
preempted by federal law.111 The FAA’s “savings” clause provides that “[a] remedy 
under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law.”112 Nonetheless, 
authority is split on whether the federal standard of care preempts the state common 
law standard of care.113 Moreover, the analysis depends on the particular theories of 
breach asserted by plaintiffs.114  
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 After the September 11 attacks, Congress created a victim’s compensation fund, 
which immunized the airlines from any claims by those who had taken such 
compensation, but alternatively allowed non-claimants to recover from the airlines 
under state tort law, subject to a damages cap equal to their insurance coverage.115 The 
resulting litigation is particularly instructive. The plaintiffs, consisting of classes of 
passengers as well as individuals injured on the ground by the crashing planes, claimed 
that the airlines were negligent in failing to screen passengers; they never should have 
allowed passengers on board with box cutters.116 On motions for summary judgment, 
the trial court considered whether the airlines had any duty at all to those on the 
ground and whether the terrorist acts were within the scope of that duty.117 The court 
held that “the Aviation Defendants controlled who came onto the planes and what was 
carried aboard. They had the obligation to take reasonable care in screening precisely 
because of the risk of terrorist hijackings, and the dangerous consequences that would 
inevitably follow.”118  
On the preemption question, the court conceded that this was a domain where 
there “has been a history of significant federal presence,”119 and noted that courts had 
“taken different positions on the scope of preemption in the aviation context.”120 The 
court dismissed any concern about preemption because the “[d]efendants ha[d] not 
shown any inconsistency between the law of duty provided by New York law and 
federal statutes or regulations.”121 Therefore, the state law claims were allowed to 
proceed.122  
The foregoing legal analysis suggests that, to the extent that the risk of spreading 
contagious disease is foreseeable, airlines may face significant liability in at least some 
of the federal circuits if they fail to act reasonably with regard to that risk. We leave to 
the side a more specific analysis regarding what sorts of precautions would be required 
under the circumstances as a fact-intensive question for a jury. But the specter of 
liability seems real, at least so far. 
2. The Duty Not to Discriminate 
In its grant of rulemaking authority to the FAA Administrator, while requiring the 
“highest degree of safety” and, in particular allowing screening of passengers for 
safety, Congress also required that rulemakers weigh “the public right of freedom of 
transit through the navigable airspace.”123 There is no regulation that restricts the 
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airlines’ ability to screen on vaccination status in particular, but there are a range of 
policies related to discrimination on disease status, which could indirectly implicate 
such a policy.  
The regulations do prohibit an air carrier from discriminating against a passenger 
with a disability, which includes those that have a communicable disease or infection 
unless the air carrier “determine[s] that the passenger’s condition poses a direct 
threat.”124 The airline may assess the condition of a “direct threat” by relying on 
“directives issued by public health authorities (e.g., the U.S. Centers for Disease 
Control or Public Health Service; comparable agencies in other countries; the World 
Health Organization)” and by “consider[ing] the significance of the consequences of a 
communicable disease and the degree to which it can be readily transmitted by casual 
contact in an aircraft cabin environment.”125 The regulation provides examples of 
direct versus non-direct threats such as the common cold, which is highly transmissible 
but lacks severe health consequences; thus, it does not pose a direct threat.126 This is in 
comparison to SARS, which is highly transmissible and has severe consequences, thus 
posing a direct threat to other passengers.127  
Applying these principles, in Adamsons v. American Airlines, Inc., the Court of 
Appeals of New York held that an airline permissibly refused passage to an individual 
in extreme pain due to an undiagnosed, mysterious illness.128 There, the passenger was 
stricken with an illness while visiting Haiti, and the illness left her in a wheelchair with 
a catheter.129 While boarding the plane from her ambulance, she cried out in pain and 
the airline decided that the plaintiff's health, as well as the safety of the other 
passengers, would be jeopardized if she was allowed to travel on that flight.130 Reading 
§ 44902, the court found that Congress “makes it abundantly clear that the decision to 
accept or refuse a passenger for air carriage lies exclusively with the airline.”131 Based 
upon considerations of safety and problems inherent to air travel, as long as the airline 
exercised discretion in good faith and for rational reasons, the decision must be 
accepted.132  
On the other hand, airlines must transport a passenger with a communicable 
disease or infection if he or she presents a medical certificate, ensuring that the 
infection is not communicable to other persons during the flight or describing 
conditions or precautions that would prevent transmission, and if the airline can 
feasibly carry out such measures.133 But, even with a medical certificate, the carrier 
maintains the discretion to require the passenger to undergo additional medical review 
by the airline itself if the certificate “significantly understates the passenger’s risk to 
the health of other persons on the flight.”134 The agency’s response to public comments 
under the final rule as promulgated clarifies that the “additional review would have to 
be conducted by medical personnel (e.g., members of the carrier's medical staff or 
medical personnel to whom the carrier referred the passenger)” and does not give 
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unbridled discretion to “staff to disregard medical certificates presented by passengers 
from their own physicians.”135  
Formally, these provisions are irrelevant to a screen based on vaccination status, 
since a passenger’s decision not to vaccinate is not itself a disability.136 Of course, 
some individuals could successfully claim that they have a medical condition, such as 
a compromised immune system, which is a disability.137 If the disability prevents the 
passenger from safely receiving the vaccine, then the airline’s screen could be 
discriminatory.138 So, unless the unvaccinated individual poses a “direct threat,” 
current law likely requires that any vaccine policy include such medical exemptions. 
Indeed, the fact that some passengers will remain unvaccinated for bona fide reasons 
increases the importance of getting everyone else vaccinated. 
More generally, however, it would be odd for a regulation to allow screening of a 
passenger because she is not vaccinated against a given disease, but disallow the 
airline to screen passengers that are actually infected with that same disease but 
present a medical certificate. One could argue for such a generally applicable policy, 
however, as being consistent with the spirit of the regulations, which discourage 
airlines from discriminating on the basis of actual disease status, which may also be a 
legally protected disability. Screening of vaccination status may better protect fellow 
passengers, since the risk of contagion may exist even when symptoms are not yet 
manifested at a level noticeable by airline personnel. 
The airlines are also prohibited from discriminating against passengers on the 
basis of religion.139 An exceedingly small number of Americans are members of 
religions that actually prohibit vaccinations, but in some contexts, “religion” has been 
interpreted very broadly.140 Whether a generally applicable vaccine mandate by a 
private party (i.e., the airline) burdens religion is another question.141 As the Supreme 
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Court said in Prince v. Massachusetts, “the right to practice religion freely does not 
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the 
latter to ill health or death.”142 If necessary, airlines could offer religious exemptions, 
but the scope and applicability of those exemptions would need to be resolved in a way 
that does not undermine the effectiveness of the vaccine screen.143 For present 
purposes of considering the airlines’ liability for failing to screen unvaccinated 
passengers, discrimination law presents no barrier.  
3. Other Elements for Liability 
The foregoing has made it clear that, with regard to communicable diseases, 
airlines do have a duty to passengers and others on the ground, regardless of whether 
that standard is given by state law or federal law. Beyond duty, for civil liability to 
apply, an injured person must also show: (1) a breach of that duty; (2) that the breach 
was the proximate cause of the injury; and, (3) damages.144 Of these, breach and 
causation are most interesting. 
With regard to the failure of an airline to screen on vaccination status, a plaintiff 
would have to show that screening was reasonable under the circumstances, which is 
to say that the airline knew, or should have known, about the risk of exposing 
passengers to unvaccinated fellow passengers.145 This element would be easier to 
prove during a particular contagious disease outbreak. In weighing breach, the court 
could consider the relative costs, such as administrative burdens, against the benefits 
of such precautions, such as the proven effectiveness of any particular vaccine at 
issue.146  
Airlines know, or should know, that simply screening passengers who are 
obviously very sick, or who self-disclose their sickness, is not sufficient to exclude 
those carrying communicable diseases. On the other hand, some older case law 
continues to be cited for the proposition that “to hold an individual negligent for 
transmitting an infectious disease, ‘it must be proved that the defendant knew of the 
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presence of the disease.’”147 On this doctrine, mere knowledge of the increased risk 
due to a passenger being unvaccinated would not suffice. 
Furthermore, the fact that airlines are not presently screening on this basis would 
be relevant as an industry standard, although it would be considered by the factfinder 
as mere evidence of non-breach since the standard of care is objective.148 Airlines 
could also benefit from the fact that leading texts on infectious disease and air travel 
have not recommended, or even focused upon, vaccination (until now).149 The airlines’ 
discretionary authority to exclude passengers provides a double-edged sword, which 
courts may read to either reiterate the airlines’ responsibility in this regard, or to give 
deference to an airline if it does so in good faith, as in Adamsons discussed above.150 
The causation requirement would also be challenging for a plaintiff, who would 
have to show that the airline’s failure to screen was a but-for cause, or a substantial 
factor, in causing the plaintiff’s own infection. Case law provides no direct guidance 
here.  
Cases involving illnesses on cruise ships are instructive, although research has 
failed to uncover cases focusing on failure to screen unvaccinated cruisers. 
Nonetheless, in Pettit v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York found that, even if the cruise ship failed to sanitize passenger 
cabins, plaintiffs did not prove causation for upper respiratory tract infections 
(“URTI”) when only 3.3% of 1934 passengers visited the ship's infirmary with cold or 
URTI symptoms.151 The passengers’ close contact with each other before and during 
the cruise, both within and outside the cruise ship, also confounded the causation 
analysis.152 Similarly in another case, a cruise passenger alleged that she had acquired 
meningitis, bacteremia, and osteomyelitis from a cruise where the ship operator failed 
to screen crewmembers and properly filter the air. 153 Her case was dismissed for 
failing to plead causation in a way sufficient to satisfy Iqbal and Twombly, which the 
court suggested would have, at the very least, required specific pleadings on 
information and belief that that other passengers or crewmembers were infected with 
the same diseases.154  
Accordingly, it will be challenging for an airline passenger to show causation 
unless she has both a molecular diagnosis of her own sickness and some evidence 
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showing transmission or circulation by the airline. The situation may be different when 
a major outbreak affects a large portion of passengers.155 
At least for fairly exotic diseases like SARS and Ebola, public health authorities 
and researchers routinely identify the specific infected passengers, specify their seats 
on the airlines, and then trace other passengers who were proximate to them, often 
using genomic analyses to distinguish particular strains of the disease.156 Nonetheless, 
the literature in this domain is more suggestive than conclusive, depending on 
retrospective analyses, rather than anything like the gold-standard of randomized 
trials.157 Still, a factfinder could find causation under the preponderance of the 
evidence standard (i.e., more likely than not) for a plaintiff who can identify the 
particular patient who was allowed to board her same flight and then show both her 
own proximity to that patient and her subsequent, timely contraction of the disease 
with the same genetic profile. 
Overall, it seems that the airline industry has some prudential market-based 
reasons to seriously consider screening passengers for vaccination status, at least when 
a potential outbreak is imminent or happening. If a passenger, or person on the ground, 
is injured due to the airline’s failure to screen, then state laws, even if applying federal 
standards, do provide some bases for holding airlines liable. Still the case for liability 
would be far from clear, and thus likely insufficient to cause airlines to fully 
internalize the costs of reasonable precautions to reduce the risk of spreading infection. 
IV.  A FEDERAL MANDATE FOR AIRLINE PASSENGERS TO BE 
VACCINATED 
A.  NEW FEDERAL RULES UNDER EXISTING STATUTES 
As shown above, Congress has authorized the Federal Aviation Administration to 
prescribe “regulations and minimum standards for [] practice, methods, and procedures 
the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.”158 
As of yet, no regulation has addressed the issue of passenger vaccination status. But 
under general statutory authority, both the FAA and the Department of Health and 
Human Services may have sufficient authority to impose an airline passenger 
vaccination mandate. Even under current statutes, there are several mechanisms for 
doing so. 
One attractive route would be for federal agencies to provide non-binding 
guidance for airlines, which advises them on how they should exercise their now-
existing rights to refuse to transport a passenger they deem may be “inimical to 
safety.”159 Similarly, under the ACAA, an airline may refuse to board a passenger, 
who presents a medical certificate from her own doctor attesting that she is not a 
danger to other passengers, if the airline nonetheless finds that the condition poses a 
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“direct threat.”160 Arguably, the Federal Aviation Administration could issue 
administrative guidelines and interpretive rules setting forth acceptable discretionary 
actions an airline could take in denying passage to unvaccinated individuals. This 
mode of regulation is familiar to health law scholars, most notably because it is a 
primary mechanism used by the Food and Drug Administration.161  
This mechanism of regulation would not require the robust procedures for notice 
and comment, and would largely avoid judicial oversight. In Association of Flight 
Attendants v. Huerta, the court held that the FAA’s notice concerning use and stowage 
of portable electronic devices aboard commercial and other aircraft was not a “final 
agency action” subject to judicial review on petition by a union representing flight 
attendants.162 Because the notice did not impermissibly and substantially alter or 
effectively amend the regulation that pertained to carry-on baggage on an aircraft, it 
did not violate the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure 
Act.163 Thus, the court reasoned that the challenged notice was not a legislative rule 
carrying the force and effect of law because the guidance offered therein reflected 
nothing more than a statement of agency policy or interpretive rule, and notice was not 
contrary to existing regulations.164  
Here, the FAA could follow the justifications stated in Association of Flight 
Attendants and issue a notice in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) and 14 C.F.R. § 
382.21(b) providing guidance as a statement of agency policy to require passenger 
vaccination.165 Just as current guidance outlines the parameters for a highly contagious 
and serious disease, like SARS, to be properly considered a “direct threat,” the agency 
could expand upon this type of example to include situations where passengers are 
unvaccinated for communicable diseases, which are then prevalent and dangerous.166 
By articulating specific directives for or against the screening of passengers on 
vaccination status, federal guidance could also effectively create a safe harbor for 
airlines against potential passenger-plaintiffs who either become infected by an 
unvaccinated passenger or complain of discrimination. An agency interpretation 
extending the “direct threat” language to individuals without proof of vaccination 
would facilitate plaintiffs’ negligence claims for airlines that failed to comply, even if 
the interpretation was non-binding. Such an interpretation could support potential 
negligence claims that: (1) the airline failed to foresee risks of a dangerous condition; 
(2) it failed to protect against it; or (3) the airline’s lack of a vaccination mandate was 
the proximate cause of a passenger’s contracted illness. One feature of such an 
approach is that it may lead to airlines performing vaccine screening, without the 
judicial scrutiny that comes with state action.167 
Federal agencies could also undertake formal rulemaking. Interestingly, federal 
law imposes a particular sort of cost-constraint on FAA regulations, requiring the 
Secretary of Transportation to consent to those regulations likely to impose $250 
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million or more on the industry or broader economy.168 It bears emphasis that 
Congress has also required that the FAA’s rules weigh “the public right of freedom of 
transit through the navigable airspace.”169 
The Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) and the CDC are other 
potential rulemakers with existing statutory authority. The TSA coordinates with the 
FAA on aviation safety, including establishing protocols for notifying the FAA of 
suspected threats to airline or passenger safety.170 It has established, in partnership 
with the CDC, a public health Do Not Board (“DNB”) list, which restricts certain 
individuals who meet specific criteria from boarding commercial aircraft with 
communicable diseases.171 Vaccination status could be similarly considered. 
Under the Public Health Service Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) is authorized to take measures to prevent the entry and spread of 
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United States and between 
states.172 The authority for carrying out these functions has been delegated to the 
Surgeon General and the CDC.173 Their rulemaking authority is remarkably broad in 
the domain of communicable disease. As the authorizing statute provides:  
[T]he Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary, is authorized 
to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to 
prevent the spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into 
the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other 
State or possession. For purposes of carrying out and enforcing such 
regulations, the Surgeon General may provide for such . . . measures, as 
in his judgment may be necessary.174 
Overall, it is clear that federal agencies already have broad authority to require 
vaccinations as a condition of airline travel. Whether, in any given case, such an 
exercise of authority would be reasonable is an open question. 
B.  A NEW STATUTORY MANDATE  
If airlines themselves do not begin vaccination screening, or if federal agencies do 
not exercise current authority to compel them to, then Congress could exercise its 
authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause to impose vaccination screening on a 
national basis.  
In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court considered whether Congress had the 
power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause to require 
that individuals purchase health insurance, and answered the question in the 
negative.175 The Court “read carefully” these clauses “to avoid creating a general 
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federal authority akin to the [states’] police power.”176 The Court reiterated that, “our 
precedents read that to mean that Congress may regulate ‘the channels of interstate 
commerce,’ ‘persons or things in interstate commerce,’ and ‘those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.’”177 For the individual mandate, the 
government’s theory was that “Congress may order individuals to buy health insurance 
because the failure to do so affects interstate commerce and could undercut the 
Affordable Care Act's other reforms.”178 The Court struck down the “individual 
mandate [because] it does not regulate existing commercial activity,” but instead 
required individuals to purchase a product—health insurance.179 The Court redeemed 
the mandate, nonetheless, under the taxing power of the federal government. 
A mandate for airlines to screen passengers for vaccine status has none of these 
constitutional infirmities, and thus need not be framed as a tax. The proposed mandate 
is itself predicated on commercial activity: the purchase of an airline ticket. It applies 
only to “those who by some preexisting activity bring themselves within the sphere of 
federal regulation.”180 And furthermore, it regulates channels and instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce—the airlines, airplanes, and their passengers.181 Such a screening 
mandate would thus receive constitutional authority regardless of whether any 
particular flight crosses state borders.182 Finally, if a vaccine reassures the travelling 
public and supports the many industries and consumers that depend on a stable airline 
industry, it also affects interstate commerce in a way that is much more direct than the 
insurance mandate did.183 The federal government already imposes an intrusive 
security search on all travelers, and nobody supposes it is beyond the Commerce 
Clause power.184 There can be little doubt that Congress has constitutional authority to 
regulate in favor of an airline vaccine screen. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Commerce Clause includes a 
power to regulate the spread of disease, by means including prohibiting travel in 
interstate commerce.185 Specifically, the federal quarantine and isolation power rests 
on the authority of the Commerce Clause.186 In 1886, the Supreme Court recognized 
that Congress would have the power to undertake a “general system of quarantine,” 
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which would have the effect of abrogating all state laws on the subject “so far as the 
two are inconsistent.”187 Since 1944, the federal government has enjoyed this 
quarantine power, for a list of diseases specified by the President’s executive orders.188 
In one case, for example, a district court dismissed a habeas petition filed on behalf of 
an airline passenger who was ordered to isolation in the United States after returning 
from Stockholm, Sweden, which was then suffering from a smallpox outbreak.189 The 
traveler was held in isolation during the incubation period for the disease because she 
failed to produce a certificate proving vaccination.190  
An airline travel vaccine mandate could theoretically impinge the right to travel 
(“RTT”), a concept found in the penumbras of the Constitution. The Supreme Court 
has explained that: 
[T]he ‘right to travel’ . . . protects the right of a citizen of one State to 
enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome 
visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the 
second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent 
residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.191  
Accordingly, most of the RTT cases have involved state restrictions, which tended to 
undermine the unity of the national government and the equality of citizens hailing 
from different states.192 The proposed vaccine screen for airline travel does not tread 
on the interests actually protected by this right. Moreover, the hypothetical mandate 
for vaccine screening restricts interstate travel, but only in one particular mode of 
transportation; individuals are still free to travel by other means.193 Ultimately, it 
would be anomalous to suppose that this unenumerated right somehow constrains the 
power of the federal government to exercise its enumerated power to regulate the 
channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Finally, the Supreme Court has 
held that the right to travel only protects against “unreasonable” burdens.194 The RTT 
is no obstacle to an airline screen. 
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The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), however, may be more of an 
impediment to such a mandate.195 This statute applies greater scrutiny than the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine when applied to laws of general 
applicability that only incidentally burden religion.196 RFRA applies when a federal 
law “substantially” burdens a person’s exercise of religion, even if the law is neutral 
and generally applicable, such as a vaccine mandate keyed to airline travel.197 In 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Supreme Court held that the Affordable Care 
Act’s contraceptives mandate substantially burdened the exercise of religion for for-
profit corporations, and that the contraceptives mandate did not satisfy RFRA’s least-
restrictive means requirement.198 The court specifically distinguished future cases that 
may involve vaccinations, and no subsequent case has applied Burwell to strike down 
a vaccination mandate.199 Nonetheless, the ruling casts a shadow over all public health 
regulation, given that virtually any objector can cloak their objection in religious 
garb.200  
If RFRA were interpreted to impinge on a vaccination mandate, the government 
or the airlines could offer exemptions. If these were applied broadly, however, the 
vaccine screen may have little marginal benefit for public health over existing 
incentives for vaccination. Instead, any such exemption should be narrow and onerous, 
in order to minimize the number of flyers who successful opt-out.201 Under RFRA, no 
such exemption would be necessary if the vaccine mandate were understood to serve a 
compelling government interest and were also the least restrictive means of serving 
that interest.202 The vaccine mandate arguably fits that bill. Finally, it is important 
to remember that RFRA is simply a statute, which Congress could overturn at 
any time. 
International law also limits federal prerogatives in this domain. In 2005, the 
United States joined the International Health Regulations, (“IHR”) a WHO program, 
which, among other things, endeavors to develop public health interventions at airports 
to prevent the spread of infectious disease and to minimize disruptions in international 
trade by “limiting unnecessary health based restrictions on international traffic and 
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trade.”203 The primary thrust of IHR focuses on the former goal, building state 
capacities and coordination of information and efforts to fight infectious disease.204 
The IHR does, however, also limit states from overreacting to an infectious disease 
outbreak, and instead purports to limit states from unilaterally imposing travel 
restrictions. 205  
The IHR is unlikely to present a real impediment to an airline vaccine screen. The 
United States already requires fourteen vaccinations for United States immigration.206 
And, the WHO already recommends the most common vaccines, especially for 
travelers.207 Thus it is not clear that there would be any conflict in an American policy 
mandate that applied a vaccine screen to airline travel, e.g., any flight operated by a 
United States carrier, or landing or departing from a United States airport.  
Even if there were a conflict with the IHR, it would not be debilitating to such a 
policy. During the Ebola outbreak, for example, Canada stopped issuing visas to 
residents and nationals of Ebola-affected countries.208 The WHO invoked the IHR to 
demand an official explanation from Canada.209 When Canada clarified that its travel 
ban did not prohibit travel by Canadians themselves or to others already holding visas, 
it appeared to placate the WHO.210 Similarly, it is not clear that the WHO would 
oppose a vaccination screen as a targeted method to reduce the spread of infectious 
disease, since it is not an outright ban on travel to or from and infected country. 
Regardless, even if the WHO saw an American vaccine screen as non-compliant, it is 
clear that the IHR has no sanctioning mechanism.211 Over the longer term, a conflict 
with the United States could erode the global consensus on the IHR, but it presents no 
practical impediment to implementation of a reasonable vaccine screen policy by the 
United States federal government.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Scholars and policymakers have overlooked the potential to screen airline 
passengers for vaccine status as an important public health tool that can reduce the 
spread of disease between the millions of people that fly on airplanes each year. Such a 
policy could also reduce the distribution of disease inter-regionally, and potentially 
create an incentive for vaccination that creates positive spillovers. Although airlines 
already have some market-based and liability-based reasons to adopt such a vaccine 
screening policy, these may be insufficient. Federal rulemakers have authority to 
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require airlines to adopt such a policy, but if Congress chose to enact a new statute for 
this purpose, it would also enjoy validity under the Constitution and international law. 
Whether an airline vaccine screen is the optimal response to a particular 
contagious disease will depend on the exercise of prudent judgment by scientists and 
policymakers. A mandate could backfire, causing a backlash that reduces overall 
vaccination rates.212 On the other hand, the failure to adopt a mandate could needlessly 
expose millions of people to infection. The point of the present analysis is simply to 
show that prudence and science should control; the law is no impediment. 
 
 
                                                 
212 See Wendy K. Mariner et. al., Pandemic Preparedness: A Return to the Rule of Law, 1 DREXEL L. 
REV. 341, 355-56 (2009) (“[T]he Boston health department sought to halt a recurrence of the disease by 
requiring vaccination against small pox[.] . . . [In contrast] [w]hen small pox appeared in New York in 1947, 
the city organized a substantial public education campaign to explain the risks of infection and the benefits 
of vaccination . . . The program was a success, and small pox soon disappeared from New York.”) 
